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Why do tech elites believe they are the world’s greatest do-gooders and why
does it matter what they say and (claim to) think? In this paper, we use the
concept of the spirit of capitalism to shed light on the ways in which normative
beliefs inform and justify the business models of tech companies. We first
reconstruct, systematize and operationalize the concept of the capitalist spirit.
We then argue that solutionist ideas have become central to the (self-)image
of today’s tech companies. Solutionism refers to the idea that the use of
technologies – by inventive and cunning entrepreneurs – is the royal road to
fixing social problems. We use a classification algorithm trained on hand-
coded documents to empirically trace the relative importance of solutionist
vis-a`-vis other normative beliefs in three novel text corpora. We find that
solutionist ideas are indeed central to the worldview of tech elites, and that
they are also gaining ground in the broader tech milieu, although not yet in the
normative discourse of capitalism at large. Finally, we theorize and illustrate
the motivating, legitimizing, and orienting role of the capitalist spirit. In
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budding debates on the moral embeddedness of economic action and on the
nature and trajectory of digital capitalism.
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1. Introduction
After years of almost unadulterated techno-optimism, digital capitalism faces a le-
gitimation crisis. The tech giants, long heralded as agents of capitalist rejuvenation
and societal progress, are now the BAADD guys: “big, anti-competitive, addictive
and destructive to democracy” (The Economist, 2018). Academics and policymak-
ers alike are calling for more regulation, while calling the tech giants out on their
harmful, extractive, and monopolistic business practices. Pushback also comes from
within. Tech companies have experienced a wave of worker protests over ethically
controversial projects (Shane and Wakabayashi, 2018). Even Mark Zuckerberg him-
self is said to have questioned his “personal techno-optimism” when he realized “that
people could abuse the thing that he built” (N. Thompson and Vogelstein, 2018).
This ‘techlash’ – and the soul-searching it has engendered – have undoubtedly
tarnished the (self-)image of tech companies as the world’s greatest do-gooders.
But they also raise a number of questions. Why did tech companies have this
reputation in the first place? Why do tech companies, along with many others,
think they are the ‘good capitalists’ and society’s best shot at tackling its biggest
problems? Does this (self-)image make a difference in how they are treated by the
public, policymakers, and their employees? Do the beliefs that come along with it
affect their business decisions or is it merely cover for profit-making? And, not least,
how much of this (self-)image has survived the techlash?
In this article, we argue that there is indeed a set of influential beliefs that inform
how tech companies see themselves – and how they are seen by others. At the heart
of these beliefs is the idea that all good things go together: that one can make money
while making the world a better place. This strange “mix of commerce and cause”
(Slee, 2016, p. 9) is based on the assumption that the use of digital technologies –
by inventive and cunning entrepreneurs – is the royal road to fixing social problems.
Following Evgeny Morozov Morozov (2013), we call this idea ‘solutionist’, as it
implies that there is a technological solution to every social problem. Much like
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the early protestants believed that economic success is a sign of chosenness, the
solutionist entrepreneurs are convinced that if they are doing good, they will also
do well; and conversely, that if they are doing well, they must also be doing good.1
We argue that solutionist beliefs are a particularly important part of the spirit of
digital capitalism, which we define as those normative beliefs that play a legitimizing,
motivating and orienting role for today’s tech companies. To be sure, when the
solutionist beliefs of tech companies collided with their ability to make profits, most
of them put profits over principles. The story of tech elites – founders, venture
capitalists, senior managers – is thus no exception to the long list of ‘cautionary
tales’ about the difficulties ‘enlightened capitalists’ face in a world of ruthless and
relentless competition (O’Toole, 2019). But this does not mean that solutionist
beliefs are inconsequential. Even if capitalists put profit over principles, solutionist
beliefs can still justify digital business models both internally (towards employees)
and externally (towards policymakers and the public); and they can tip the balance
in favor of one course of action when no single profit-maximizing strategy suggests
itself.
For the most part, solutionist beliefs are not disingenuous: many tech elites, we
argue, really do believe that they are making the world a better place, however mis-
guided this may seem. It seems natural to satirize these beliefs as (self-)deceptions,
as HBO’s Silicon Valley has done so brilliantly. But as countless interviews, inside-
stories, and anecdotes illustrate, many in tech really do believe in the liberating
potential of technology. Ironically, Google’s Astro Teller left a meeting with Silicon
Valley’s producers in a huff, angrily telling them that “We don’t do stupid things
here [at GoogleX]. We do things that actually are going to change the world, whether
1While this solutionist ethic was forged in the cultural crucible of Silicon Valley, we argue that it
has assumed a broader significance. Not just because Californian companies play an essential role
in the ongoing digital transformation of contemporary societies and economies. But also “because
the avatars of [digital] capitalism have persuaded so many people that their way is the way of the
future” (Sennett, 2006, p. 12).
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you choose to make fun of that or not” (Marantz, 2016). This is not the reaction
of an insincere person. Solutionism might be bullshit, but, for the most part, its
proponents are not, in Harry G. Frankfurt’s sense, bullshitting.
This paper makes several contributions. Conceptually, we reconstruct the con-
cept of the capitalist spirit, and further develop and operationalize it. Theoretically
and substantially, we contribute to the budding debate on the moral and ideational
embeddedness of economic action (Abend, 2014; Beckert, 2016, 2019; Fourcade and
Healy, 2007; Granovetter, 2017) while also elucidating the ideas and values under-
lying the ongoing digital transformation of economies and societies (Zuboff, 2019).
Empirically, we systematically measure the spirit of (digital) capitalism and trace
its evolution over time and across sectors. Specifically, we use a supervised clas-
sification method (Hopkins and King, 2010; Jerzak, King, and Strezhnev, 2019)
on several large and novel text corpora to identify and trace the relative impor-
tance of different normative ideas. We also theorize and qualitatively illustrate the
significance of these findings for understanding the course and character of digital
capitalism.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first give an systematizing overview of the
intellectual history of the spirit of capitalism, which we define as those normative
beliefs that legitimate, motivate, and orient the actions of capitalist actors (sec-
tion 2). After describing the solutionist ethic at the heart of the spirit of digital
capitalism (section 3), we introduce our data sources and explicate and validate our
methodological approach (section 4). We then present our finding and discuss them
in light of more qualitative evidence on the legitimizing, motivating, and orienting
role of the spirit of digital capitalism. In doing so, we also distinguish our ‘newest’
from what Boltanski and Chiapello Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) have called the
new spirit of capitalism (section 5). We conclude with a brief discussion of the
broader theoretical relevance of our argument, not least against the background of
the current legitimation crisis of digital capitalism (section 6).
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2. The Spirit of Capitalism – Revisited
The concept of the capitalist spirit undoubtedly belongs to the most colorful and
controversial concepts in the history of sociological thought. It was first introduced
by Werner Sombart in Der moderne Kapitalismus. For Sombart, every economic
epoch was defined as much by its predominant economic attitudes – its spirit –
as by its institutional form (Sombart, 1902). Arguing that the capitalist spirit
was defined the combination of acquisitiveness and economic rationalism, Sombart
thus laid the conceptual groundwork for an inquiry into the ideational elements
underlying capitalist action (Sombart, 1902, p. 391).
Max Weber built on this groundwork when he borrowed Sombart’s concept in
his famous study The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. What Weber
had in mind, however, was less a cognitive attitude than a “peculiar ethic” (Weber,
2007, p. 17). Weber’s capitalist spirit is thus not “mere business astuteness”, but an
“ethos” the violation of which “is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of
duty” (Weber, 2007, p. 17). 2 Weber’s account, however, remains genealogical. The
spirit of capitalism fades away after it had performed its midwifely function. Today’
capitalism no longer motivates its subjects ethically, but “educates and selects [them]
through a process of economic survival of the fittest” (Weber, 2007: 20). Resting
on “mechanical foundations” (Weber, 2007, p. 124), capitalism no longer needs the
helping hand of its spirit.
Almost a century later, the concept of the capitalist spirit is picked up by Luc
Boltanski and E`ve Chiapello in The New Spirit of Capitalism. Building on Weber’s
idea that “people need powerful moral reasons for rallying to capitalism”, they define
the spirit of capitalism as an “ideology that justifies engagement in capitalism”
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, pp. 8–9). While a “minimal argument in terms of
2Weber consistently uses the concept of the capitalist spirit in quotation marks and limits his use
of this “somewhat pretentious phrase” (Weber, 2007, p. 13) to value-rational aspects of economic
action (Weber, 2001, p. 50).
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compulsory submission to economic laws” might be “a motive for staying in a job”
it isn’t one “for getting involved in it” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p. 8). To
really mobilize workers – and to defend itself against its tireless critics – capitalism
needs “to draw upon resources external to it, beliefs which, at a given moment in
time, possess considerable powers of persuasion” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007,
p. 20).
Drawing on the sociology of justification, Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the
spirit of capitalism draws on different orders of worth to do its justificatory work
(Boltanski and The´venot, 2006). The literature identifies eight orders of worth or
polities (cite´s), which we reconstructed and systematized in Table 1. These orders
of worth provide actors with criteria for what is valuable or worthy (e.g. efficiency in
the industrial polity, recognition by others in the opinion polity); evaluation criteria
(e.g. technical performance or productivity, fame or followers); a mode of investment
or sacrifice (e.g. disenchantment, the forgoing of privacy); an ideal type (e.g. the
manager, the celebrity); a type of insanity (e.g. squander, anonymity); a test (e.g.
a formal test procedure, publicity); and an underlying anthropology and cosmology
(e.g. the idea that the world can be mastered through calculation and planning, the
idea of humans as craving for recognition).
At different stages of capitalist development, the spirit of capitalism appeals to
some orders of worth in particular, tapping into the moral resources they provide;
the spirit of capitalism is thus always a combination of or compromise between
different orders of worth (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, pp. 16–19). The first
version of the spirit of capitalism – corresponding to the high capitalism of the 19th
and early 20th century – is dominated by bourgeois values of thrift, responsibility,
and faith in progress, embodied by the market, the domestic and the industrial polity
respectively. During the heyday of the managerial capitalism of the 20th century,
the industrial polity – with its emphasis on rational organization and bureaucratic
planning – massively grows at the expense of the domestic polity, which had glorified
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the company patriarch and not the manager. Finally, with the rise of the knowledge
economy in the 1970s, the capitalist spirit increasingly draws on the newly formed
project polity and its values of agility, flexibility, and collaboration.
Our own definition of the capitalist spirit is based on this conceptual history. We
follow Weber’s argument against Sombart and restrict the concept of the capital-
ist spirit to normative beliefs. And we follow Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument
against Weber and claim that these beliefs continue to matter but change over time.
What Sombart, Weber, and Boltanski and Chiapello hinted at but have not artic-
ulated systematically, however, are the legitimizing, motivating, and orienting roles
of the capitalist spirit. Spelling them out allows us to systematize the concept of the
capitalist spirit and connect it to more recent debates on the moral and ideational
embeddedness of capitalist action.
2.1. Legitimation
For Sombart, the capitalist spirit was crucial in lending “general acceptance” (Som-
bart, 1902, p. 379) to acquisitive and rationalistic attitudes that, while essential for
capitalism, were long frowned-upon if not stigmatized. Similarly, Weber believed
that for capitalism to assert itself in a “world of hostile forces” (Weber, 2007, pp. 20–
21), it had to tap into the legitimatory power of religious beliefs. Weber also knew
that entrepreneurs were rarely received “peacefully”; instead, a “flood of mistrust,
sometimes of hatred, above all of moral indignation, regularly opposed itself to the
first innovator” (Weber, 2007, p. 31). Weber thus uses the concept of the capitalist
spirit in the context of a theory of justifiable actions, in which normative ideas –
religious or otherwise –subjectively motivate but also intersubjectively legitimate
economic actions (Campbell, 2018, p. 12).
Central to Boltanski and Chiapello’s account is that idea that capitalism is always
subject to criticism. Social critics decry capitalism for producing poverty, inequal-
ity, exploitation and egoism; artistic critics denounce capitalism as the source of
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alienation, oppression, disenchantment, and loss of authenticity (Boltanski and Chi-
apello, 2007, p. 38). Its spirit allows capitalism to selectively appropriate – and
thereby diffuse – these criticisms. The new spirit of capitalism, for example, in-
corporated the artistic critique of managerial capitalism as overly hierarchical and
bureaucratic by singing the praise of flat hierarchies, de-centralization, flexibility,
and self-reliance. These elements were, of course, highly congenial to the demands
of a postindustrial economy. The appropriation of the artistic critique therefore
eased the transformation of capitalism to a more flexible but less secure form, while
simultaneously stealing its critics’ thunder.
More recently, business scholars have emphasized the importance of actively cu-
rating one’s public image and carefully framing one’s economic activities as essen-
tial parts of successfully managing one’s non-market environment (Bach and Blake,
2016). We argue that the spirit of capitalism amplifies the effectiveness of such
legitimacy-seeking strategies by shaping the ‘moral background’ (Abend, 2014) of
the public and political debates on capitalism. The moral background “provides
the theories and tools that people and organizations employ to ascertain goodness
in the realm of morality” (Abend, 2014, p. 30). By drawing on the theories and
tools embodied in the current manifestation of the capitalist spirit, capitalists can
‘juice up’ the persuasiveness of their legitimacy-seeking activities and thereby ensure
favorable regulatory and reputational outcomes (Bach and Blake, 2016; Dror, 2015).
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2.2. Motivation
Both Sombart and Weber are clear about the central role of the capitalist spirit in
creating and sustaining the “dominant motives” (Sombart, 1902, p. XXI) and “psy-
chological sanctions” (Weber, 2007, p. 145) underlying capitalist action. Boltanski
and Chiapello also emphasize capitalism’s reliance on an enthusiastic workforce,
especially for positions of leadership. By incorporating morally appealing ideas,
capitalism can “maintain its powers of attraction”, i.e. its ability to attract and
motivate (elite) workers (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p. 20).
What the theorists of the capitalist spirit have put their fingers on is capitalism’s
perennial ‘motivation problem’ (Olma, 2016). How capitalists can motivate workers
to not only join their companies, but to give their blood, sweat and tears for them.
Companies can, of course, use the stick of organizational sanctions and the carrot of
economic rewards. But there are limits to such coercive and economic methods of
ensuring compliance (Etzioni, 1975; cf. Habermas, 1988, p. 75). As Bewley Bewley
(1999, p. 431) writes:
“Workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not
wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators. Employers
want workers to operate autonomously, show initiative, use their imagination, and
take on extra tasks not required by management; workers who are scared or dejected
do not do these things.”
Companies, especially those at the technological frontier, are thus incentivized to
employ methods of normative compliance; methods that are meant – and were shown
– to instill identification with the company based on shared values and symbolic
rewards (Etzioni, 1975; Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012, p. 349). Since the
capitalist spirit periodically incorporates widely held normative ideas (often by co-
opting them from capitalism’s critics), drawing on these ideas can help companies
convince their employees that their respective values are aligned and thereby ensure
commitment.
10
2.3. Orientation
Max Weber realized that ideas can be more than mere means of external and internal
justification; they can also like “switchmen” (Weber, 1946, p. 280) change the tracks
on which (capitalist) actors pursue their economic interests. Recent economic soci-
ology has similarly argued that while capitalists may well want to maximize profits,
they rarely know how to go about it, especially when they operate radically in-
novative sectors. Acting under the shadow of economic uncertainty, they cannot
know in advance which investment decision will pay off and which innovations will
take off. It is therefore often beliefs – such as heuristics from the past or fictional
expectations about the future – that guide the hand of even the most rational and
selfish business men (Beckert, 2016; Granovetter, 2017). The moral ideas embodied
in the capitalist spirit thus provide capitalists not only with effective justifications
in the face of internal and internal criticism, but also with plausible strategies and
appealing goals in the face of radical uncertainty (Schro¨der, 2013).
3. The Solutionist Ethic
As its predecessors, the spirit of digital capitalism draws on several orders of worth at
the same time. Its defining and distinguishing feature, however, is the strong appeal
to the polity of solutionism. Evgeny Morozov defines solutionism as an ideology
that recasts “all complex social situations either as neatly defined problems with
definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes that can
be easily optimized – if only the right algorithms are in place” (Morozov, 2013, p. 5).
Building on this definition, and on a qualitative analysis of documents by and about
digital elites (Nachtwey and Seidl, 2017), we conceive the solutionist polity as an
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order of worth in which value or worthiness derives from solving social problems
with technological means and entrepreneurial wit (see also Table 1).3
This implies that all relevant social problems can, in principle, be solved techno-
logically; that there is a technological hammer for every social nail.4 Social problems
are not the result of asymmetries in power or wealth that call for a political solution.
Rather, they are the result of inefficiencies and deficiencies that can be eliminated
with the right technology (Slee, 2016). This gives solution its characteristic techno-
libertarian bend (cf. Barbrook and Cameron, 1996). The solution to people’s finan-
cial difficulties, for example, is not a higher minimum wages or stronger unions, but
smart algorithms – offered by companies like Even – that help people manage their
budgets more efficiently.
While digital technologies have massively amplified the reach and appeal of so-
lutionist ideas (Morozov, 2013, 15–16), solutionism is not a product of the digital
era but has deeper roots: in the culture of engineering and its belief that there
is a ‘technological fix’ to all societal problems (Johnston, 2017) as well as in the
“New Communalist ethos of tool use” (Turner, 2006, p. 238) and their faith “that
experimentation and the proper deployment of the right technologies could save
the world” (Turner, 2006, p. 244). These techno-optimist tendencies are ampli-
fied by the culture of coding, which nurtures an “almost aesthetic (. . . ) dislike for
inefficiency” (C. Thompson, 2019, p. 21); and a hubristic control illusion that under-
stands social problems in the same way as coding problems by extrapolating from
the programmer’s intuition that one “can program any procedure [one] thoroughly
understand[s]” (Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 103–104). Such “computational thinking”
3Others have used different concepts to describe similar ideas. For example, Meredith Broussard
Broussard (2018, p. 14) coins the term “technochauvinism” to describe the “belief that tech is
always the solution”; and James Bridle Bridle (2018, p. 4) uses the term “computational thinking”
to describe the belief “that any given problem can be solved by the application of computation”.
4Bill Gates uses the same metaphor: “Any problem I will look at how technical innovation can
help solve that problem. It’s the one thing I know and the one thing I’m good at. That’s my
hammer. And a lot of problems look like nails, because I’ve got a hammer” (Schlosser, 2019).
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(Bridle, 2018, p. 4) is perfectly epitomized by Mark Zuckerberg’s ‘first principle’ of
engineering, which says that one should ‘think of every problem as a system and
every system can be better. No matter how good or bad it is, you can make every
system better’.
But despite the importance of technology, the solutionist is more than just an
engineer or coder. She is, in Schumpeter’s sense, not an inventor but an innovator
– someone who commercializes an invention. An invention that cannot be commer-
cialized is a lost invention. Larry Page realized this when he was still a boy. Reading
a biography of Nicola Tesla, who was a brilliant inventor but a terrible business man,
he concluded:
“You don’t want to be Tesla. He was one of the greatest inventors, but it’s a sad, sad
story. He couldn’t commercialize anything, he could barely fund his own research.
You’d want to be more like Edison. If you invent something, that doesn’t necessarily
help anybody. You’ve got to actually get it into the world; you’ve got to produce,
make money doing it so you can fund it” (Serwer, 2008).
Therefore, to really make a difference, the solutionist needs to be an entrepreneur
as much as a technologist. But the solutionist is not just an entrepreneur; she is a
philanthro-entrepreneur. In the solutionist worldview, making money and making
the world a better place are not mutually exclusive but can and should go hand in
hand. Silicon Valley, as Tom Slee put it, “may have its share of the world’s richest
people, but it has always seen itself and presented itself as being about more than
money: it’s also about building a better future” (Slee, 2016, p. 9). The solutionist
not only abhors the lone inventor, who has her way with technology but has no
business model. She also rejects those who lack a purpose and are only in for the
money (like those on Wall Street).
Purpose alone, however, without technology and a viable business model, is
equally flawed. Hence the rejection of traditional politics as the best way to ad-
dress social ills – a rejection that echoes the New Communalists turn “toward social
and economic spheres as sites [of] social change (Turner, 2006, p. 244). Solutionism
13
shares this sentiment with philanthrocapitalism – the idea and practice of applying
a business logic to philanthropy in order to make it more efficient, impacted-oriented
and financially profitable (McGoey, 2012). Many tech elites in fact use their tech-
nological and business acumen to make charity bigger, bolder and more data-driven
(Stanley, 2015). But while both solutionists and philanthrocapitalists portray public
and private interests as mutually compatible, they do so from opposite directions,
as it were.
Philanthrocapitalism is about the “idea that charity is good business” and can
therefore be profitable (McGoey, 2012, p. 187). Solutionism, on the other hand, is
about the idea that business itself can be philanthropic. In the solutionist world-
view, there is a natural alignment between business opportunities and social prob-
lems. ”Want to become a billionaire? Then help a billion people. The world’s
biggest problems are the world’s biggest business opportunities” (Diamandis, 2020).
Philanthropy is thus neither a separate stage of life nor a more or less profitable
side business. Whereas traditional philanthropist in the wake of Carnegie had es-
poused the idea that “after-the-fact benevolence justifies anything-goes capitalism;
that callousness and injustice in the cutthroat [marketplace] are excused by later
philanthropy” (Giridharadas, 2018, p. 164), the solutionist has a different take. Do-
ing good is not an atonement for doing well, but simply the other side of the same
coin. ”It’s been a yin and yang equation”, as Tom Werner puts it: ”We’re changing
the world on one side and building a great company on the other side” (Hull, 2014).
While capitalists have always justified their profit-seeking activities with reference
to some abstract notion of the common good – usually some version of Smith’s
invisible hand –, solutionists believe that businesses can contribute to the common
good much more directly. In this “new, postmodernized version of Adam Smith’s
invisible hand” (Zˇizˇek, 2006), companies with the grandest purpose will miraculously
also be the companies with the biggest profit. Underlying this idea – that all good
things go together – is an “almost religious faith” (Giridharadas, 2018, p. 41) in
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the harmony of human interests and the ability of technologies to create win-win
situations.
“What’s amazing about tech (. . . ) is that there are so many opportunities to have
your cake and eat it, too (. . . ) There’s a stereotype that you have to choose in life
between doing good and making money. I think for a lot of people that’s a real choice
(. . . ) But for technology, there are a significant number of opportunities – Google
search being the most massive example of all time – where we simultaneously are
doing something lucrative and really good for the world. [A] lot of times you can get
in situations where they’re all aligned, where the bigger the reach of the good you’re
doing, the more money you’ll make” (Justin Rosenstein in Giridharadas, 2018, p. 41).
This notion, that in an age of brilliant technologies, “entrepreneurship can be-
come synonymous with humanitarianism” (Giridharadas, 2018, p. 47), is based on a
worldview that understands individuals and societies as simultaneously flawed and
full of potential. There is a tension between what is possible – given the laws of
physics – and what is realized. Erasing this tension is the source of the solutionist
impetus. This idea finds its expression in the techno-utopist “rhetoric of potential-
ity” (Dickel and Schrape, 2017, p. 47). The world is full of bugs but can be fixed
with the right technology. It is the calling of every solutionist to do just that: up-
grade humanity by becoming a social engineer in the true sense of the word. For
now, the focus is on giving humans access to information and to connect them with
each other; for through “the power of technology, age-old obstacles to human in-
teraction, like geography, language and limited information, are falling and a new
wave of human creativity and potential is rising” (Schmidt and Cohen, 2013, p. 4).
But the end-game is much grander: solving humanity’s oldest problems – old age,
sickness, death – by upgrading humans themselves.
Animated by the normative power of the possible, solutionists have little respect
for the status quo – and the institutions that maintain it. Hence the veneration for
pioneers and disruptors. If the status quo is flawed but also full of potential, the
pioneers and disruptors are but the harbingers of a better future. Breaking the law
15
becomes civil disobedience in the name of a better world. “You can’t change the
world without a certain amount of healthy willingness to break the rules” (Sebastian
Thrun in CBS News, 2014). And if change is a good thing, more change is even
better. “If you change the lives of one hundred million people, you are not successful.
You are only successful if you change the lives of 1 billion people” (Sebastian Thrun
in Schulz, 2014). This, of course, requires audacity and the willingness to fail,
since “failure and invention are inseparable twins” (Bezos, 2015). But for those
hungry and foolish enough, the rewards will be big – not in the hereafter, as for
the protestants, but in the here and now. Daring to dare becomes something of an
ethical commandment.
4. Data & Methodological Approach
To test our arguments, we collected three novel text corpora and devised a coding
scheme for hand-coding documents into the different polities. We then used these
hand-labeled documents to estimate the proportion of documents in each category
in the larger corpora.
4.1. Data
Each corpus serves a distinct analytical purpose. The first corpus consist of public
statements of digital elites in which they talk about themselves or their worldview
(e.g. interviews, speeches). Digital elites are here narrowly defined as members of
the 2015 Forbes 400 who played crucial roles (e.g. founder, CEO, major investor)
in tech companies founded after 1996, and therefore made most of their money in
the last 20 years or so (it thus excludes ‘first-generation’ digital elites like Bill Gates
and Steve Jobs). The purpose of this sampling procedure – which resulted in 2326
paragraphs – was to identify the spirit of digital capitalism where we would most
expect it: in the professed beliefs of the most recent generation of digital elites –
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individuals like Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg or Elon Musk.5 The second corpus
consists of articles published in Wired between the magazine’s founding in 1993 and
2019, which we scraped from the web and split into paragraphs. After removing
very short paragraphs, we ended up with a total of 1.514.839 paragraphs. Wired is
widely known as the house organ of the tech community, and thus a greats source
for understanding the intellectual proclivities, fads, and currents of the wider tech
milieu.6 The third corpus consists of articles published in the Harvard Business
Review (HBR) between 1985 and 2020, which we also scraped from the web and
split into paragraphs. Again, after removing very short paragraphs, this resulted in
a total of 161.204 paragraphs. The purpose of this corpus is see to which extent the
spirit of digital capitalism has already diffused into the mainstream of management
literature and capitalist self-reflection, which HBR arguably represents more than
any other outlet.7
4.2. Methodological Approach
Our coding scheme is the result of a iterative process of theory-building and em-
pirical validation, where theoretically derived – or, in the case of the solutionist
polity: qualitatively developed – polities were specified and disambiguated in mul-
tiple rounds of coding.8 This iterative procedure was meant to balance theoretical
ambition and empirical reliability and feasibility. Our unit of analysis were para-
graphs, as they are often natural units of meaning; they often make, as it were, a
point, and are short enough to be relatively unambiguous and long enough to be
informative. Paragraphs were assigned to a polity when they contained a clear and
affirmative reference to one of the normative principles laid out in Table 1. If para-
graphs were purely descriptive or did not unambiguously refer to one polity, they
5While some digital elites publicly express themselves more frequently than others, we have at
least one and no more than 8 documents for each of the 30 digital elites identified on the Forbes
400. For more details on the sampling procedure, see subsection A.1
6For details, see subsection A.2
7For details, see subsection A.3
8The coding scheme can be downloaded from https://timoseidl.com/publications/. Replica-
tion Materials will be made available at a later point.
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were assigned to a residual category. Here are two examples of paragraphs that were
coded as solution and market respectively:
“We are investing in driverless technology (. . . ), why? Well a million people a year
die in cars, and how many more millions get injured, it’s just needless right, and
how much time, how much worse is our lives because we’re sitting there with a
steering wheel in our hands being stressed out and frustrated with traffic remember,
(. . . ) when you can give people their time back, and when you run these cars more
efficiently and there’s no more traffic, this is magic.”
“No. We are thinking in terms of purely commercial, business relations. Neither
‘friendship’ nor ‘international cooperation’ can be an excuse for not making a profit.
These new ventures are very important strategically for us.”
Since our dataset contains several hundred thousand paragraphs, we used a super-
vised learning approach to estimate category proportions for the corpora based on
a set of hand-coded paragraphs. This involves three steps (Grimmer and Stewart,
2013, p. 275). First, we hand-coded 1518 documents from all three datasets. After
extensive coder training (done, of course, with different documents), we achieved
good reliability scores on various metrics (Krippendorff’s alpha = 0.7).9 Most dis-
agreements between coders were the result of one coder opting for the residual cat-
egory. This suggests that the polities themselves are quite distinct but that coders
sometimes have difficulties assessing whether or not a statement is unambiguous or
clear enough to qualify for a certain polity. If we remove documents with such dis-
agreements, the reliability scores become very good (Krippendorff’s alpha = 0.87).
Second, based on the labelled training set we infer category proportions in the
unlabeled test set using an method of automated nonparametric content analysis
called readme (Hopkins and King, 2010; Jerzak, King, and Strezhnev, 2019). Most
supervised learning techniques are optimized to classify individual documents and
follow a parametric ‘classify and count’ logic; readme, by contrast, ‘directly’ es-
timates the proportion of documents in each category, which has been shown to
9For more details, see B
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produce less model dependent and biased results (classifiers can produce biased es-
timates of proportions even if they correctly classify a high number of documents)
(Hopkins and King, 2010: 234). readme makes the crucial assumption “that the
labelled conditional feature matrix is an unbiased estimator of the unlabeled con-
ditional feature matrix” (Jerzak, King, and Strezhnev, 2019, p. 6), that is, that
the hand-labelled documents contain word profiles – or examples of language use –
sufficiently similar to those in the test set (Hopkins and King, 2010, p. 237). Given
that the hand-labelled documents are a random subset of the unlabeled documents
and thus cover the same time (relatively short) period, we are confident to meet this
assumption.
The third step is to validate the model output, and based on the results, to
estimate the category proportions for (time-slices of) the various corpora. Since we
are not classifying individual documents, traditional validation metrics like accuracy
or recall are not available. To validate our results, we thus produced 100 random
50/50 splits of the 1203 correctly coded paragraphs and run readme on each of these
training set/test set splits. Since we know the ‘true’ proportion of each category in
the test sets, we can compare them to the category proportions estimated by readme.
For our analysis, we use the R package readme2 , which improves on the original
readme package in two ways: first, it uses pre-trained dictionaries of word vectors
to improve the choice of optimal features from a large space of potential document
summaries in a way that maximizes textual discrimination between categories; and
is uses matching techniques to remove documents from the labelled set that are so
different from those in the unlabeled set that they are unlikely to result from the
same data-generating process (which may happen due to semantic change) (Jerzak,
King, and Strezhnev, 2019).
Figure 1 shows that readme2 produces roughly accurate predictions for the various
categories. While the residual category is considerably underestimated, especially if
we remove unmatched word stems, this seems acceptable since readme ‘spreads’ the
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unused percentages relatively evenly across the other categories. This also makes
sense given that the residual category contains paragraphs that make references to
multiple polities. Thus, while we may not be able to interpret small differences due
to these errors, we can give good estimates of the prevalence of different types of
normative justification and we can trace larger shifts in their relative importance.10
Figure 1: Estimated and true category proportions (individual dots refer to the re-
sults of different runs)
10In the paper, we present the results of readme2 with matching. However, as C shows, the results
are quite similar if we do not use matching, and our substantive interpretations remain the same.
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5. Results & Discussion
Which are the values digital elites refer to in their speeches and interviews? In other
words, what is the normative (self-)image they have or want to project? We find
a belief in the world-improving power of technological entrepreneurship is indeed
central to the belief system of digital elites, closely followed by the faith in the bless-
ings of the market and the value of efficiency (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the traditional
authority of the domestic polity, the vain desires of the opinion polity, and ecolog-
ical values of sustainability are – perhaps surprisingly – less important. While this
confirms our argument that digital elites are indeed enthralled by solutionist ideas,
one might argue that for all their lofty rhetoric, digital capitalist are still capitalists:
so why should we care about their solutionist sermons? Are they not just cheap
talk, rhetorical veneers on the stony reality of capitalist profit-seeking? We think
that one should care, for three reasons.
First, solutionist ideas have come to define not just how tech elites see themselves
but also how they are seen by others and thereby legitimized them in the eyes of
policymakers and the public. In that sense, even if they are veneers, they helped
stabilize what they were meant to cover. Second, their solutionist credentials helped
tech companies convince their workers that their values and those of the company
are aligned. If tech workers believe that the authority of tech elites is legitimate –
because both want to use technologies to make the world a better place – compliance
costs will decline and motivation increase.11 Conversely, if these companies violate
solutionist principles, worker engagement will turn into resistance. In that sense,
talk is not always cheap. Third, even if what tech elites publicly profess is not what
they privately feel, solutionist ideas might still guide their profit-seeking activities
11Weber himself believed that legitimate rulers, i.e. rulers that can justify their rule on rational,
traditional, or charistmatic grounds, can exercise their authority more effectively that if they
had to rely on brute coercion. There is every reason to believe that this is also true for capitalist
organizations.
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Figure 2: References to different polities in statements by digital elites
by pointing them towards problems that promise large profits. In that sense, even
the loftiest rhetoric may be consequential. Let us discuss these points in turn.
5.1. Legitimation
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the recent techlash is how late it came.
Given their central role in contemporary economies and societies, how could tech
companies get away with so little regulatory oversight and political scrutiny for so
long (Zuboff, 2019, p. 100)? Our answer is that they were not only very adept in
managing their non-market environment, but could also exploit a favorable moral
background in which solutionist ideas had already taken hold (Abend, 2014). At
a time when capitalism was increasingly criticized for producing private but not
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public wealth and for creating rather than solving social problems, solutionism lend
legitimacy to those that promised to harness the power of entrepreneurship and
technology for the common good – and thereby also to capitalism itself. It was easy,
for a company like Uber, for example, to win over regulators by promising to solve
‘grand societal challenges’ such as safety, harassment, or transportation (Uzunca,
Rigtering, and Ozcan, 2018).
In addition, solutionism provided a powerful rationale for limiting regulatory over-
sight and political scrutiny. Who, after all, is the government to stop tech companies
from tackling many of the problems the government itself is no longer able to solve?
Even Bill de Blasio, certainly no friend of big-tech, acknowledged that Silicon Val-
ley’s “technology-religion pushed away the notions that [tech companies] should
be regulated, very effectively” (Blasio, 16.09.2019, 41:29-41:34). This legitimizing
function of the capitalist spirit is essential in understanding the nature of digital
capitalism. For a central belief of many tech elites – and often a crucial part of
their business model – is the assumption that “lawlessness is the necessary context
for ‘technological innovation’” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 104). Larry Page, for example, has
argued that “[o]ld institutions like the law and so aren’t keeping up with the rate
of change that we’ve caused through technology” and only hamper Google’s ability
to “build really great things” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 105). And it was as late as 2013
that Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen Schmidt and Cohen (2013, p. 3) wrote that
the digital world, “the world’s largest ungoverned space”, was “not truly bound by
terrestrial laws”. That such claims have, until recently, largely been accepted is not
only the result of skillful lobbying and a congenial neoliberal zeitgeist. It is also
the result of a favorable moral background that allowed tech companies to convince
others that they were indeed making the world a better place, and that regulation
would only limit their ability to do so (Zuboff, 2019, pp. 101–127).
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5.2. Motivation
While many have mocked Google’s famous former motto ‘Don’t be evil’, fewer have
appreciated its significance (Foroohar, 2019). For it not only provided means to
align the company’s values with those of its workers and thus ensure the latter’s
engagement and loyalty, it also significantly limited Google’s operational leeway.
‘Don’t be evil’ is more than a branding ploy. Many Googlers really believe – or at
least believed – in the company’s mission, which is evident from our own interviews
with them in both California and Europe as well as from the accounts of others
(Foroohar, 2019). And these beliefs put limitations on what Google can and can-
not do. A recent inside-story, for example, recounts that to “a remarkable extent,
Google’s workers really do take ‘Don’t Be Evil’ to heart. C-suite meetings have been
known to grind to a halt if someone asks, ‘Wait, is this evil?’” (Tiku, 2019).
Ignoring these limitations, which Google has repeatedly done, comes at the cost
of worker disengagement and even resistance – the price Google has to pay for the
motivational power of its solutionist rhetoric. This is exactly what happened during
the recent wave of tech worker resistance. For example, a contract between Google
and the Pentagon about the use of Artificial Intelligence to improve the targeting
of drone strikes has proven deeply controversial among employees and has “touched
off an existential crisis” at the company (Shane and Wakabayashi, 2018). Incidents
like this lay bare some of the political differences between the more libertarian tech
elites and the more liberal tech workers – differences that the solutionist rhetoric
had long masked (Weigel and Tarnoff, 2019). As one Googler put it:
“Libertarianism is the ethos of the leaders of these big tech companies, not the rank
and file. Our campaign had nothing to do with libertarianism. We stood up because
(. . . ) we believe a strong ethical framework that values human life and safety is
inseparable from positive technological progress (. . . ) Before the [protests against
Project Maven], a lot of Googlers had never considered the fact that their values
might not be aligned with the values of leadership. (. . . ) Ultimately, the Project
Maven campaign wasn’t just about whether Google should build this one tool for the
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military. It was about using our power as workers to ensure that technology is built
for social benefit and not just for profit.” (cited in Tarnoff, 2018).
One of the reasons for the success of tech workers – Project Maven was eventually
cancelled – was that tech workers could hold the tech companies “hostage to [their]
own public image” (Tiku, 2019). And this public image matters if companies want
to recruit the best and brightest workers. Tech workers care about the “mission of
the company and what the companies are trying to achieve”; “employees”, as one
recruiter put it, “are wising up to the fact that you can have a mission statement
on your website, but when you’re looking at how the company creates new prod-
ucts or makes decisions, the correlation between the two is not so tightly aligned”
(Bowles, 2018). Across elite universities, there is “a growing sentiment that Silicon
Valley’s most lucrative positions aren’t worth the ethical quandaries” (Goldberg,
2020). Facebook, in particular, had an increasingly difficult time recruiting talent
“as the social stigma of working for Facebook began outweighing the financial ben-
efits” (Bowles, 2018). In short, the spirit of digital capitalism can supply powerful
non-economic incentives, but it comes at the price of normative and economically
costly commitments that capitalists can only ignore at their peril.
5.3. Orientation
When Mark Zuckerberg was urged to sell Facebook to Yahoo! in 2006, he refused,
arguing that he holds the “really deep belief that when companies are executing well
on their vision they can have a much bigger effect on the world than people think,
not just as a business but as a steward of humanity” (Friend, 2015). Here, the idea
that Facebook could be a ‘steward of humanity’ helped Zuckerberg make a decision
laden with much uncertainty; Zuckerberg would have arguably decided differently
were he only in for the money.
Solutionist ideas, however, not only affect what entrepreneurs do with their com-
panies, but also how they allocate resources within them – or how venture capitalists
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and financial actors allocate resources to them. Venture capitalist John Doerr, for
example, puts his money in missionaries, not mercenaries because he beliefs that
the best entrepreneurs are those that not only care about success but also about
significance (Taylor, 2016). And Google spends billions tackling huge problems
with radical but feasible solutions not just because this “sends a corporate signal,
both internally and externally, that [it] still nurtures the idealism” on which it was
founded” (D. Thompson, 2017); but also because it beliefs that solving humanity’s
great problems is the surest way to make Google even richer. Google’s technological
imaginaries, in other words, create an imagined future that focuses the company’s
present activities while instilling investors and the public with fictional expectations
that boost the companies economic reputation and market value (Beckert, 2016).
These orientational processes can undoubtedly be very self-serving, as Fred Turner
recounts:
“About ten years back, I spent a lot of time inside Google. What I saw there was
an interesting loop. It started with, ‘Don’t be evil.’ So then the question became,
‘Okay, what’s good?’ Well, information is good. Information empowers people. So
providing information is good. Okay, great. Who provides information? Oh, right:
Google provides information. So you end up in this loop where what’s good for people
is what’s good for Google, and vice versa” (Turner, 2017).
What is easily missed here is that the belief that information is good nudged
Google to focus on those products – of all possible products – that would put
Google in a position to ‘organize the worlds information’. This is was what being
good meant, after all, so Google focused its investments in ‘information-organizing’
products such as maps, books, or news, which eventually proved highly profitable.
By providing actors with beliefs about what is right and wrong, the spirit of capital-
ism can thus mitigate economic uncertainty by pushing capitalists towards certain
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potentially profitable directions and away from others, guiding their hand when
economic rationality does not dictate any single course of action.12
5.4. Solutionism in the Wider Tech Milieu
However, even if we accept that solutionists ideas have taken hold in the hearts
and minds of digital elites, we still don’t know whether they have spread beyond
this exclusive circle. How, one might ask, do they fare in the wider digital milieu.
Figure 3 depicts the evolving importance of different orders of worth in Wired,
widely considered “the mouthpiece of the digital revolution” (Wolf, 2003: 52). While
solutionist ideas are somewhat less important in the wider tech milieu than for
the digital elites themselves, they do play a considerable role, especially after the
dot.com bust and the financial crises. More recently, as the techlash gathered steam,
the ascent of solutionist ideas has slowed down a bit; however, as we discuss in the
conclusion, it would be premature to write solutionism off. Interestingly, the civic
polity plays an important role during the era of early internet regulation in the
1990s, becomes less important in the 2000s, just when the solutionist polity gains
ground, and rises again more recently as tech became increasingly politicized.
The projective polity, meanwhile, remains fairly marginal. This is somewhat
surprising, given that the discourse on digitalization is often associated with the
‘Post-Fordist’ values of decentralization and authenticity. Eran Fisher, for exam-
ple, has argued that whereas Fordist technology discourse extolled the ability of
technology to mitigate the exploitative aspects of capitalism (instability, insecurity,
inequality), Post-Fordist technology discourse promised to overcome “the alienating
components of capitalism” while downplaying “its exploitative components” (Fisher,
12This orientational function can also help capitalist coordinate their behavior. Much like fictional
expectations, they can “help economic actors work in concert in the face of uncertainty: if they
share a conviction that the future will develop in a specific way and that other actors will thus
behave in foreseeable ways, they may use these expectations to coordinate their decisions. [They
thus] contribute to the dynamics of capitalism, since the correspondence of expectations, or
‘frame alignment’, anchors decisions for investment and innovation“ (Beckert, 2016, p. 11).
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Figure 3: References to different polities in Wired paragraphs (1993-2019)
2010, p. 235). According to Fisher, the new, post-Fordist spirit of capitalism is “in-
extricably linked with network technology discourse” (Fisher, 2010, p. 243) and its
promise of flat hierarchies and a more authentic but also more flexible capitalism.13
Thus, while Fisher highlights the role of new (network) technologies in amplifying
the appeal and reach of Boltanski and Chiapello’s new spirit of capitalism, he also
conceptualizes this spirit as a “spirit of networks” (Fisher, 2010, p. 243) – just
like Boltanski and Chiapello have argued that capitalism’s new spirit makes “the
network a normative model” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p. xxii); and just like
Manuel Castells has argued that a “spirit of informationalism” will serve as the
“ethical foundation of the network enterprise” (Castells, 2010, p. 214). And indeed,
in the eyes of a highly influential group of cultural entrepreneurs around Steward
Brand and Kevin Kelly, digital technologies – and the internet in particular – were
13Similarly, Gary Yeritsian has argued that the new spirit of capitalism – with its emphasis on
engagement, sharing, and horizontality – has diffused from the office space of the cadres into the
social factory of the Web 2.0, promising digital laborers in symbolic rewards what they lack in
material compensation (Yeritsian, 2018).
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the symbol of a new social and economic order (Turner, 2006, p. 202). Drawing on
a long history of cybernetic and countercultural ideas, this group argued that the
digital entrepreneurs of the late 20th century
“would do what the New Communalists had failed to accomplish: they would tear
down hierarchies, undermine the sorts of corporations and governments that had
spawned them, and, in the hierarchies’ place, create a peer-to-peer, collaborative
society, interlinked by invisible currents of energy and information” (Turner, 2006,
p. 209).
By joining “the cultural legitimacy of the counterculture to the technological and
economic legitimacy of the computer industry” (Turner, 2006, p. 219), these cyber-
cultural apostles not only legitimized a hands-off approach to internet regulation.
They also articulated a broader vision of a society – often called the Californian ide-
ology (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996) – in which digital technologies would “marry
the competitive demands of business with the desire for personal satisfaction and
democratic participation”, achieving “productive coordination without top-down
control” (Taylor, 1994). The internet promised an escape from the iron cage of
Fordism; it “became both a metaphor for [a post-Fordist society] and a means to
bring it into being” (Turner, 2006, p. 219).
Our results partly corroborate these findings. We do not find many references
to the projective polity in the Wired corpus (though, as we will see shortly, we
do find them in the HBR corpus). But we do see the valuation of non-conformity,
authenticity and anti-regulationism reflected in the prominent role of the inspiration
and market polity – particularly in the 1990s. This is also in line with Wired’s
libertarian and somewhat esoteric bend, especially during its early days. Thus, a
central implication of our argument and our empirical findings is that despite the
close connection between the internet and Post-Fordist values, the spirit of digital
capitalism is distinct from the network-centered, post-Fordist spirit of capitalism.
To be sure, the projective polity has not been abandoned, as is evident from both
Figure 2 and Figure 3. Just like its predecessors, the spirit of digital capitalism is a
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compromise between different polities. But its defining feature is not the appeal to
values of the projective polity, but to those of the solutionist polity.
Crucially, it was the changing nature of capitalism itself that undermined the
justificatory power of the projective polity and ushered in solutionism. The projec-
tive polity was congenial to a type of capitalism that put networks over hierarchies,
project-based collaboration over formalized division of labor, and flexibility over se-
curity. Historically, it offered a plausible defense against the artistic critics of Fordist
capitalism, and an appealing justification for its neoliberal, post-Fordist successor.
Its hero, the entrepreneurial self, navigates a networked world of changing projects
while constantly trying to learn and innovate (Bro¨ckling, 2016). The solutionist
polity, by contrast, is less a reaction to the artistic critique of the alienating aspects
of capitalism than to the social critique of capitalism’s lack of solidarity and concern
for the common good. It is congenial to a type of capitalism – epitomized by Wall
Street – that is rampant with individualism and seemingly devoid of a social con-
tract. The solutionist hero, the philanthro-entrepreneur, uses his business acumen
and tech-savviness to optimize the world – not just himself, and it is not surpris-
ing that solutionist ideas gained prominence after the globalization protests of early
2000s and the financial crisis.14
At a time when the promissory legitimacy of neoliberalism – its ability to plau-
sibly promise a better future – has exhausted itself (Beckert, 2019), solutionism
took up (part of) the slack. The spirit of digital capitalism no longer justifies an
economic order that is primarily plagued by rigid Fordist hierarchies, but one that
is beset by post-Fordist selfishness, precarity, and lack of civic-mindedness. Digital
technologies are once again heralded as a panacea for capitalism’s ills. But this time
14As we can in Figure 3, solutionist ideas seem to have gained in prominence after the bursting
of the dot.com bubble, which drove out the more mercenary “carpetbaggers” and left behind
the more idealistic “true believers” (Tacy, 2011). Moreover, the ‘PayPal Mafia’ around Peter
Thiel and Elon Musk, many of them ardent solutionists, played an outsized role in funding and
shaping many startups in the early 2000s, as venture capital retrenched and they filled the void
(Mcnamee, 2019, p. 48).
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they do not promise to “flatten organizations, globalize society, decentralize control,
and help harmonize people” (Nicholas Negroponte in Turner, 2006, p. 1). Rather,
they claim to solve society’s problems root and branch, from traffic deaths to death
itself. These differences are related to differences in the underlying technologies.
While miniaturization and networking were the central technological developments
during the heyday of the projective polity, today’s technological landscape is domi-
nated by Artificial Intelligence and platform infrastructures. Due to the centripetal,
centralizing tendencies, the later lend themselves to solutionist applications more
than personal computers or the internet.
5.5. Solutionism and Capitalist Self-Reflection
The anti-statist and technophile tendencies of the Californian counterculture have
thus found a new home in the solutionist worldview. And while they find their most
fierce adherents in the elites of today’s platform capitalism, they also made their
way into the wider digital milieu.15 But did solutionist ideas also make headways
outside of tech elites and the wider tech community? Figure 4 depicts references to
the different orders of worth in the HBR – perhaps the central venue for capitalist
self-reflection. Unsurprisingly, we find that the values of the industrial and market
polity play a prominent role in a magazine that is centrally concerned with the
efficiency of organizations and the functioning of markets. What is remarkable,
however, is that the project polity becomes a lot more important in the 1990s while
15Weber made clear that the spread of attitudes associated with the spirit of capitalism required
“long and arduous process of education” (Weber, 2007, p. 25), with the protestant religious
communities being the main agents and loci of socialization. In the case of the spirit of digital
capitalism, the annual Burning Man event might play a similar role – one in which the solutionist
beliefs of tech elites and workers alike are reinforced in ritualistic practices and Durkheimian
experiences of collective effervescence (cf. Beckert, 2016, p. 79). “As once, 100 years ago, churches
translated Max Weber’s protestant ethic into a lived experience for congregations of industrial
workers, so today Burning Man transforms the ideals and social structures of bohemian art
worlds, their very particular ways of being ’creative’, into psychological, social and material
resources for the workers of a new, supremely fluid world of post-industrial information work”
(Turner, 2009, pp. 75–76).
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the civic and industrial polities lose ground. This strongly confirms Boltanski and
Chiapello’s argument that the values of flexibility and agility have started to partly
replace the values of technical efficiency and planning, which had their heyday in
the age of Fordism. Starting in the late 1980s, we find this shift to post-Fordist
values reflected in capitalist discourse.
Figure 4: eferences to different polities in HBR articles (1985-2020)
The solutionist polity, meanwhile, remains marginal. Although we cannot be cer-
tain, it might have slightly grown in recent years, at about the same time when
business scholars have rekindled a debate on the purpose of business. With much
force, they have argued that businesses should abandon their narrow fixation on
maximizing shareholder value and instead focus on creating “shared value” (Porter
and Kramer, 2011) and “shareholder welfare” (Hart and Zingales, 2017) by “pro-
ducing profitable solutions to problems of people and planet” (Mayer, 2018, p. 12).
Even the Business Roundtable has recently moved away from the idea that the sole
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purpose of business is to increase shareholder value; instead, it encouraged compa-
nies to also invest in their employees, protect the environment and deal fairly with
their suppliers (Gelles and Yaffe-Bellany, 2019). It remains to be seen to what ex-
tent ideas such as these serve as a bridgehead that allow solutionist values to enter
the more mainstream debates on the values on which capitalist businesses should
be build. For now, the new spirit of capitalism is still the dominant configuration
of normative principles that justify capitalist action. But in the cultural crucible of
Silicon Valley, a new spirit has been forged that already dominates the most impor-
tant sector of our times, and, with the digitalization of economies and societies at
large, is destined to become a central normative force legitimizing, motivating and
orienting entrepreneurs and workers from all walks of capitalist life.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have revisited and revised the concept of the capitalist spirit. Using
both qualitative and quantitative evidence, we have shown how a new capitalist
spirit has formed in the beating heart of contemporary capitalism: the tech sector.
We have shown that the solutionist ethic – the belief that there is a profitable
technological solution to every social problem – is wide-spread among tech elites and
the wider tech milieu. We have not found a similar trend for capitalist discourse
at large. This, however, might be due to a similar time lag as in the case of the
projective polity, which, while having originated in the late 1960s, only really gained
momentum in the late 1980s. We have also theorized and illustrated how solutionist
ideas have legitimized tech companies before policymakers and the public, helped
them motivate their employees, and oriented their business decisions in the face of
uncertainty.
We have thus contributed – conceptually, theoretically, and empirically – to the
budding debate on the moral and ideational embedded of capitalism. In particular,
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we have shown how the normative orders of justification embodied in the spirit of
capitalism shape the moral background against which capitalism is justified (Abend,
2014); how we can ‘measure’ and trace the normative logics that underlie and un-
dergird capitalist action (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Granovetter, 2017) and
through which different moral views of the market society are expressed (Fourcade
and Healy, 2007); and how imagined futures – and the economic dynamism and
promissory legitimacy they supply – are informed by and rooted in particular nor-
mative principles, such as those of solutionism (Beckert, 2016, 2019).
In addition to uncovering the ‘newest’ spirit of capitalism, we have also reproduced
Boltanski and Chiapello’s finding that a new spirit of capitalism – one that centers
around post-Fordist notions of flexibility and project-based activity – has risen in
the 1980s and still dominates capitalist discourse. However, given the dominance of
solutionist ideas in the tech sector, and given the economic and cultural dominance
of the tech sector itself, it is likely that the solutionist ethic will gradually develop
the “moral and normative force” (Sennett, 2006, p. 10) to also justify capitalism
at large. As the fourth industrial revolution unfolds, this fourth, solutionist spirit
of capitalism might well come to shape how most companies justify their business
models, attract and appeal to their employees, and decide on a course of action
when no single course is obvious.
While solutionism provided a powerful normative defense of capitalism at a time
when capitalists were increasingly criticized for producing, rather than solving so-
cial problems, its proponents have recently themselves come under criticism for
producing all sorts of social problems themselves, from creating addiction to spread-
ing misinformation. While this has somewhat dampened the appeal of solutionist
ideas (see Figure 3), it would be a mistake to write solutionism off. First, as tech
companies move into new sectors, they remain unabashedly solutionist. As late
as 2019, Google and Apple promise to use their technological prowess to ‘trans-
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form health care’, ‘improve outcomes’ and ‘save lives’. And Facebook advertises its
newest crypto-currency as a tool to ‘empower billions of people’.
Second, tech companies have developed a kind of second-order solutionism where
they promise technological solutions to problems that their own technologies have
created. Co-opting the criticism that they have hijacked people’s minds with their
addictive and distracting technologies, tech companies have developed technological
fixes to these primary technological and business defects, such as apps that help
users understand their habits and nudge them towards more healthy ones. In the
case of Facebook’s Time Well Spent Initiative, they even co-opted the slogan of their
most prominent critics at the Center for Humane Technology. This superficial incor-
poration of “tech-humanist” ideas “may provide Silicon Valley with a way to protect
that power from a growing public backlash – and even deepen it by uncovering new
opportunities for profit-making” (Tarnoff and Weigel, 2018). These developments
remind us that solutionist ideas may well continue to shape the course and charac-
ter of the ongoing digital revolution – we therefore better understand what they are
about.
35
References
Abend, Gabriel (2014). The Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of Busi-
ness Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bach, David and Daniel J. Blake (2016). “Frame or Get Framed: The Critical Role
of Issue Framing in Nonmarket Management”. In: California Management Review
58.3, pp. 66–87.
Barbrook, Richard and Andy Cameron (1996). “The Californian Ideology”. In: Sci-
ence as Culture 6.1, pp. 44–72.
Beckert, Jens (2016). Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dy-
namics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
– (2019). “The Exhausted Futures of Neoliberalism. From Promissory Legitimacy
to Social Anomy”. In: Journal of Cultural Economy, pp. 1–13.
Bewley, Truman F. (1999). Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Bezos, Jeff (2015). 2015 Letter to Shareholders. Available at: https://ir.aboutamazon.
com/static-files/f124548c-5d0b-41a6-a670-d85bb191fcec.
Blasio, Bill de (16.09.2019). NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio on why tech can’t solve
all our problems, and how New York lost Amazon HQ2. Available at: https:
//soundcloud.com/recode-decode/nyc-mayor-bill-de-blasio-on.
Boltanski, Luc and E`ve Chiapello (2007). The new spirit of capitalism. London:
Verso.
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent The´venot (2006). On Justification: Economies of Worth.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bowles, Nellie (2018). ‘I Don’t Really Want to Work for Facebook.’ So Say Some
Computer Science Students. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/
15/technology/jobs-facebook-computer-science-students.html.
Bridle, James (2018). New dark age: Technology, knowledge and the end of the future.
London and Brooklyn NY: Verso.
36
Bro¨ckling, Ulrich (2016). The Entrepreneurial Self: Fabricating a New Type of Sub-
ject. Los Angeles: Sage.
Broussard, Meredith (2018). Artificial Unintelligence: How Computers Misunder-
stand the World.
Campbell, Colin (2018). The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism.
New extended edition. Cultural sociology. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Castells, Manuel (2010). The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age:
Economy, Society, and Culture Volume I: Second Edition with a new Preface.
Wiley-Blackwell.
CBS News (2014). Man behind Google Glass puts new twist on education. Available
at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-glass-sebastian-thrun-on-
newest-project-udacity/.
Diamandis, Peter (2020). How to become a Billionaire. Available at: https://www.
diamandis.com/blog/how-to-become-a-billionaire.
Dickel, Sascha and Jan-Felix Schrape (2017). “The Logic of Digital Utopianism”.
In: Nanoethics 11.1, pp. 47–58.
Dror, Yuval (2015). “‘We are not here for the money’: Founders’ manifestos”. In:
New Media & Society 17.4, pp. 540–555.
Etzioni, Amitai (1975). A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power,
involvement, and their correlates. Rev. and enl. ed. New York: Free Press.
Fisher, Eran (2010). “Contemporary Technology Discourse and the Legitimation of
Capitalism”. In: European Journal of Social Theory 13.2, pp. 229–252.
Foroohar, Rana (2019). Don’t be Evil: How Big Tech Betrayed its Founding Princi-
ples - And All of Us. New York: Currency.
Fourcade, Marion and Kieran Healy (2007). “Moral Views of Market Society”. In:
Annual Review of Sociology 33.1, pp. 285–311.
37
Friend, Tad (2015). Who Funds the Future? Available at: https://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2015/05/18/tomorrows-advance-man.
Gelles, David and David Yaffe-Bellany (2019). Shareholder Value Is No Longer Ev-
erything, Top C.E.O.s Say. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/
19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html.
Giridharadas, Anand (2018). Winners take all: The elite charade of changing the
world. New York: Knopf.
Goldberg, Emma (2020). ‘Techlash’ Hits College Campuses. Available at: https:
//www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/style/college-tech-recruiting.html.
Granovetter, Mark (2017). Society and Economy: Framework and Principles. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
Grimmer, Justin and Brandon M. Stewart (2013). “Text as Data: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts”. In: Political
Analysis 21.03, pp. 267–297.
Habermas, Ju¨rgen (1988). Legitimation Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hart, Oliver and Luigi Zingales (2017). “Companies Should Maximize Shareholder
Welfare Not Market Value”. In: Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 2.2,
pp. 247–275.
Hopkins, Daniel J. and Gary King (2010). “A Method of Automated Nonparametric
Content Analysis for Social Science”. In: American Journal of Political Science
54.1, pp. 229–247.
Hull, Dana (2014). Q&A with SunPower CEO Tom Werner, on solar’s next big
thing. Available at: https://www.siliconvalley.com/2014/05/16/2014-qa-
with-sunpower-ceo-tom-werner-on-solars-next-big-thing/.
Jerzak, Connor T., Gary King, and Anton Strezhnev (2019). An Improved Method
of Automated Nonparametric Content Analysis for Social Science. Available at:
https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/word.pdf.
38
Johnston, Sean F. (2017). “Technological parables and iconic illustrations: American
technocracy and the rhetoric of the technological fix”. In: History and Technology
33.2, pp. 196–219.
Judge, Timothy A. and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller (2012). “Job attitudes”. In:
Annual review of psychology 63, pp. 341–367.
Marantz, Andrew (2016). How ”Silicon Valley” Nails Silicon Valley. Available at:
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/how-silicon-valley-
nails-silicon-valley.
Mayer, Colin P. (2018). Prosperity: Better business makes the greater good. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
McGoey, Linsey (2012). “Philanthrocapitalism and its critics”. In: Poetics 40.2,
pp. 185–199.
Mcnamee, Roger (2019). Zucked: Waking up to the Facebook Catastrophe. Penguin
Books.
Morozov, Evgeny (2013). To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism
and the Urge to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist. New York: Public Affairs.
Nachtwey, Oliver and Timo Seidl (2017). Die Ethik der Solution und der Geist des
digitalen Kapitalismus. Available at: http://www.ifs.uni-frankfurt.de/wp-
content/uploads/IfS-WP-11.pdf.
O’Toole, James (2019). The Enlightened Capitalists: Cautionary tales of business
pioneers who tried to do well by doing good. New York NY.
Olma, Sebastian (2016). Digital Taylorism: Labour between Passion & Serendipity.
Available at: https://networkcultures.org/sebastianolma/2016/12/23/
digital-taylorism-labour-between-passion-serendipity/.
Porter, Michael E. and Mark R. Kramer (2011). “Creating Shared Value”. In: Har-
vard Business Review January-February, pp. 1–17.
Schlosser, Kurt (2019). Review: Netflix documentary on Bill Gates reveals chaos, de-
termination and love ‘Inside Bill’s Brain’. Available at: https://www.geekwire.
39
com / 2019 / review - netflix - documentary - bill - gates - reveals - chaos -
determination-love-inside-bills-brain/.
Schmidt, Eric and Jared Cohen (2013). The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future
of People, Nations and Business. New York: Knopf.
Schro¨der, Martin (2013). “How Moral Arguments Influence Economic Decisions and
Organizational Legitimacy - the Case of Offshoring Production”. In: Organization
20.4, pp. 551–576.
Schulz, Thomas (2014). “Larry und die Mondfahrer”. In: Der Spiegel 10.
Sennett, Richard (2006). The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press.
Serwer, Andy (2008). Larry Page on how to Change the World. Available at: https:
//money.cnn.com/2008/04/29/magazines/fortune/larry_page_change_the_
world.fortune/index.htm.
Shane, Scott and Daisuke Wakabayashi (2018). The Business of War’: Google Em-
ployees Protest Work for the Pentagon. Available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html.
Slee, Tom (2016). What’s Yours is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy. New York
and London: OR Books.
Sombart, Werner (1902). Der Moderne Kapitalismus. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
Stanley, Alessandra (2015). Silicon Valley’s New Philanthropy. Available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/opinion/siliconvalleys-new-philanthropy.
html?_r=0.
Tacy, Chris (2011). What was Silicon Valley like after the bubble burst in the early
2000s? Available at: https://www.quora.com/What-was-Silicon-Valley-
like-after-the-bubble-burst-in-the-early-2000s.
Tarnoff, Ben (2018). Tech Workers Versus the Pentagon: An Interview with Kim.
Available at: https://jacobinmag.com/2018/06/google-project-maven-
military-tech-workers/.
40
Tarnoff, Ben and Moira Weigel (2018). Why Silicon Valley can’t fix itself. Available
at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/03/why-silicon-valley-
cant-fix-itself-tech-humanism.
Taylor, Bill (1994). Control in the Age of Chaos. Available at: https://hbr.org/
1994/11/control-in-an-age-of-chaos.
– (2016). The Best Entrepreneurs Are Missionaries, Not Mercenaries. Available at:
https://hbr.org/2016/04/what-separates-high-impact-entrepreneurs-
from-those-who-dont-make-a-big-difference.
The Economist (2018). How to Tame the Tech Titans. Available at: https://www.
economist.com/leaders/2018/01/18/how-to-tame-the-tech-titans.
Thompson, Clive (2019). Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of
the World. New York: Penguin Press.
Thompson, Derek (2017). Google X and the Science of Radical Creativity. Available
at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/11/x-google-
moonshot-factory/540648/.
Thompson, Nicholas and Fred Vogelstein (2018). Inside the Two Years That Shook
Facebook - and the World. Available at: https : / / www . wired . com / story /
inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/.
Tiku, Nitasha (2019). Three Years of Misery Inside Google, the Happiest Company
in Tech. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/inside-google-three-
years-misery-happiest-company-tech/.
Turner, Fred (2006). From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole
Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
– (2009). “Burning Man at Google: A cultural infrastructure for new media produc-
tion”. In: New Media & Society 11.1-2, pp. 73–94.
– (2017). Don’t Be Evil: Fred Turner on Utopias, Frontiers, and Brogrammers.
Available at: https://logicmag.io/justice/fred-turner-dont-be-evil/.
41
Uzunca, Bilgehan, J. P. Coen Rigtering, and Pinar Ozcan (2018). “Sharing and
Shaping: A Cross-Country Comparison of How Sharing Economy Firms Shape
Their Institutional Environment to Gain Legitimacy”. In: Academy of Manage-
ment Discoveries 4.3, pp. 248–272.
Weber, Max (1946). “The Social Psychology of the World Religions”. In: From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology. Ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York:
Oxford University Press, pp. 267–301.
– (2001). “Weber’s Second Reply to Karl Fischer, 1908: From the Archiv fu¨r Sozial-
wissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. 26, pp. 275–83”. In: The Protestant ethic de-
bate. Ed. by Austin Harrington, David J. Chalcraft, and Mary Shields. Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press, pp. 43–51.
– (2007). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: Translated by Talcott
Parsons. With an Introduction by Anthony Giddens. London: Routledge.
Weigel, Moira and Ben Tarnoff (2019). The Stark Political Divide Between Tech
CEOs and Their Employees. Available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/
153046/stark-political-divide-tech-ceos-employees.
Weizenbaum, Joseph (1976). Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment
to Calculation. San Francisco: Freeman.
Yeritsian, Gary (2018). “‘Capitalism 2.0’: Web 2.0 Manifestoes and the New Spirit
of Capitalism”. In: Critical Sociology 44.4-5, pp. 703–717.
Zˇizˇek, Slavoj (2006). Nobody has to be vile. Available at: https://www.lrb.co.uk/
v28/n07/slavoj-zizek/nobody-has-to-be-vile.
Zuboff, Shoshana (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Hu-
man Future at the New Frontier of Power. Public Affairs.
42
Appendices
A. Data Collection & Sampling
In the following subsections, we provide more detail on the three corpora used in
the paper.
A.1. Digital Elites Corpus
Compiling the elites corpus – a corpus of interviews, speeches, self-descriptions by
the most recent generation of digital elites – involved three steps. First, we used to
2015 Forbes 400 list to identify the most successful (i.e., richest) tech elites, selecting
those that made their money with digital technologies, be it as entrepreneurs (e.g.
Larry Page, Elon Musk), high level executives (e.g. Eric Schmidt, Sundar Pichai)
or as some mixture of entrepreneur and venture capitalists (e.g. Peter Thiel, Reid
Hoffmann). Second, we selected those on that list that started what made them rich
in the second half of the 1990s or later, the argument being that this newest gener-
ation of mainly web-based entrepreneurs should be quite different – both age-wise
and with regard to the kinds of companies they built – from an earlier generation
of mainly PC-based entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs or Bill Gates (O’Reilly, 2017).
Finally, we manually searched for recent documents in which these individuals de-
scribe their motivation or make programmatic statements from which their broader
beliefs – as opposed to their technical knowledge, etc. – are evident. This sampling
procedure resulted in 90 documents – all dating from between 2009 and 2018 – which
were then split into 2326 paragraphs. Table 2 depicts the individuals that make up
the digital elites corpus as well as how many documents from each individual were
included.
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Table 2: List of digital elites (based on Forbes 400) with number of documents
Name Number of Documents
Bob Parsons 3
Brian Acton 2
Brian Chesky 6
Dustin Moskovitz 3
Elon Musk 8
Eric Schmidt 4
Evan Spiegel 3
Evan Williams 3
Gabe Newell 3
Jack Dorsey 3
Jan Koum 5
Jeffrey Skoll 3
Jerry Yang 1
Joe Gebbia 2
Larry Page 5
Marc Benioff 4
Mark Zuckerberg 4
Michael Rubin 1
Nathan Blecharczyk 1
Nick Woodman 1
Peter Thiel 5
Pierre Omidyar 3
Reid Hoffman 4
Robert Pera 2
Sean Parker 2
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Sergey Brin 3
Sundar Pichai 3
Travis Kalanick 3
Overall 90
A.2. Wired Corpus
We scraped the Wired corpus from the web and – after manually inspecting the
data – we are reasonably confident to have acquired if not all than most articles
published in Wired between the magazine’s founding in 1993 and 2019. We again
split all articles into paragraphs – our unit of analysis. We then removed very short
paragraphs with less than 200 characters as they often contain no useful information.
As a result, we ended up with 1.514.839 paragraphs.
A.3. Harvard Business Review Corpus
We also scraped the Harvard Business Review corpus from the web. With an au-
tomated script, we first generated the article-links and then downloaded the text
from the website. As the texts were already divided into paragraphs in the HTML-
source, we were able to extract the articles fairly easy. However, we realized that
the articles we obtained via our library’s access provider were incomplete as not all
articles are available as HTML. We were thus far unable to retrieve to retrieve all
documents or to reliably extract paragraphs from documents that are only available
as column-separated PDF files. Figure 5 depicts the HBR articles that are available
as HTML files (red) versus all available articles (black) on EBSCO Host. To avoid
bias, we restricted our analysis – for the moment – to all years after 1985, where
were able to acquire not all but most articles. This procedure resulted in 161.204
paragraphs.
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Figure 5: HBR articles available as HTML files (red) versus all available (black)
articles
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B. Intercoder Reliability
After training the coders and refining the coding scheme, we randomly sampled
1518 paragraphs with roughly equal numbers from the three corpora: 398 for the
elite corpus, 591 from the Wired Corpus, 529 from the Harvard Business Review
Corpus. Table 3 reports various measures of intercoder reliability, plus bootstrapped
confidence intervals when available. ?? depicts a confusion matrix showing that
many disagreements resulted from one coder choosing “Other” while the other code
chose one of the polities. As reported in the paper, if we remove these disagreements,
reliability scores further improve, as reported in Table 5.
Table 3: Intercoder Reliabiltiy Metrics
Measure Value 95% Confidence Interval
Krippendorff’s Alpha 0.697 0.68–0.71
Cohen’s Kappa 0.697 0.67–0.73
Gwet’s AC1 0.747 0.72– 0.77
Holsti’s Method (Percentage Agreement) 0.769 -
47
M
ar
ke
t
In
d
u
st
ry
In
sp
ir
at
io
n
D
om
es
ti
c
O
p
in
io
n
C
iv
ic
P
ro
je
ct
G
re
en
S
ol
u
ti
on
is
t
O
th
er
M
ar
ke
t
1
6
7
13
2
1
4
0
10
0
9
27
In
d
u
st
ry
1
1
1
5
1
0
0
1
7
0
3
23
In
sp
ir
at
io
n
1
2
4
4
0
2
0
3
0
2
9
D
om
es
ti
c
0
0
1
9
0
0
3
0
0
1
O
p
in
io
n
0
0
0
0
3
4
1
0
0
0
0
C
iv
ic
1
7
0
2
1
6
3
3
0
1
24
P
ro
je
ct
2
4
4
2
0
1
8
3
0
5
17
G
re
en
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
S
ol
u
ti
on
is
t
12
9
1
1
1
3
5
0
9
9
5
O
th
er
30
26
13
0
8
11
18
0
7
5
4
1
48
Table 5: Intercoder Reliabiltiy Metrics
Measure Value 95% Confidence Interval
Krippendorff’s Alpha 0.868 0.86–0.87
Cohen’s Kappa 0.868 0.85–0.89
Gwet’s AC1 0.889 0.87– 0.91
Holsti’s Method (Percentage Agreement) 0.898 -
C. With and Without Validation
This section compares the results of readme2 depending on whether or not we remove
unmatched word stems. It shows that remain roughly similar and none of the
differences affects our substantive interpretations.
Figure 6: Elites with and without matching
49
Figure 7: Wired with and without matching
Figure 8: Harvard Business Review with and without matching
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